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THE INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT DEFENDERS
ON AFFIRMATIVE CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT
Alexander A. Reinert*
Improving access to justice has received increasing attention from many
corners over the past decade. Here in New York, as just one example, spurred
by the leadership of former Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, the New York
Court of Appeals has taken steps to improve access to justice in New York
state courts in numerous ways: by seeking to enhance pro bono
representation, improving assistance for unrepresented persons in state
courts, and increasing funding for civil legal aid.1 The U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ), under the leadership of former Attorney General Eric Holder,
established the Office for Access to Justice in March 2010 “to address the
access-to-justice crisis in the criminal and civil justice system.”2 And at
Fordham Law School, David Udell has led a team of researchers at the
National Center for Access to Justice to identify access-to-justice trends and
metrics in the fifty states.3
These efforts, laudable as they are, for the most part have focused on access
to justice for defendants in criminal and civil litigation. As the topic of this
Colloquium implies, however, there is another dimension to access to justice:
the ability of litigants to obtain justice through affirmative rights
enforcement. And as various barriers have arisen to affirmative litigation, it
is hard to deny that we live in an era of contracting civil liability.4
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. This Article was prepared for the
Colloquium entitled Access to Justice and the Legal Profession in an Era of Contracting Civil
Liability, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on
October 27, 2017, at Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to the participants in
this Colloquium for their insightful comments on an earlier draft.
1. In 2015, then-Chief Judge Lippman announced that he had created a Permanent
Commission on Access to Justice. See Permanent Commission on Access to Justice, N.Y ST.
UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://www.nycourts.gov/accesstojusticecommission/ [http://perma.cc/
F3TM-VDGN] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
2. Access to Justice, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atj [http://perma.cc/
ZJ4E-HSQV] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
3. NAT’L CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE, http://ncforaj.org/ [http://perma.cc/QX3J-2JHT]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
4. Many of the participants in this Colloquium have documented this trend. See, e.g.,
Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL.
L. REV. 371, 377; J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms
in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1161–75 (2012); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping
Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251, 251 (2007); Suja A. Thomas,
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The focus of this brief Article will be on a conundrum, particularly in the
area of civil rights enforcement: the federal government—in particular the
DOJ—can be one of the most efficient and powerful vindicators of civil
rights, while at the same time one of the most effective advocates for
imposing barriers to affirmative civil rights enforcement. At the same time
that the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division (CRD) is entering federal court to
“vindicat[e] rights and remedy[] inequities,”5 attorneys in the Civil Division
(either from Main Justice or in any number of U.S. Attorney’s offices) are
appearing in court to prevent the same.6 No doubt the same observation
applies to certain state governments that have active affirmative civil rights
enforcement bodies while also maintaining well-resourced defensive
litigation bureaus.
For my purposes, this observation has important consequences. It might
bear on the professional obligations of the government attorney who appears
in a defensive posture, a topic that Bruce Green and others have addressed in
many thoughtful articles.7 I will address some potential ethical implications
toward the end of this Article, but it is not my principal focus because I am
not convinced that that is where the solution lies. Instead, I want to
concentrate on what the observation means for executive branch law
enforcement priorities, how the dynamic impacts broad access-to-justice
concerns, and the implications for institutional design.
I am going to try to do so in four parts. First, this Article contrasts agenda
setting in defensive bureaus with agenda setting in the affirmative posture.
The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 16–18 (2010); Michael L. Wells, Constitutional Remedies:
Reconciling Official Immunity with the Vindication of Rights, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 713, 759
(2014).
5. Vanita Gupta, Head of the Civil Rights Div. of the Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association Annual Conference (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/head-civil-rights-division-vanita-gupta-deliversremarks-national-legal-aid-defender [http://perma.cc/DS95-2244].
6. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Government: Justice and the Civil
Division, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 182 (1990) (explaining that the Civil Division “was
established in 1868 to handle claims against the government—which in a broad sense it still
does”).
7. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Hard Bargaining on Behalf of the Government
Tortfeasor: A Study in Governmental Lawyer Ethics, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 345, 356
(2005); Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 840 (2000); Steven K.
Berenson, The Duty Defined: Specific Obligations That Follow from Civil Government
Lawyers’ General Duty to Serve the Public Interest, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 13, 15 (2003); Paul
Figley, Ethical Intersections & the Federal Tort Claim Act: An Approach for Government
Attorneys, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 347, 357 (2011); Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers
“Seek Justice” in Civil Litigation?, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235, 267–70 (2000); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Representation of Public Agencies in Civil Matters, 9
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 211, 221 (2000); Daniel S. Jacobs, The Role of the Federal Government
in Defending Public Interest Litigation, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 44–48 (2003); Catherine
J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer:
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 951 (1991); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293,
1296–97 (1987); Elisa E. Ugarte, The Government Lawyer and the Common Good, 40 S. TEX.
L. REV. 269, 272 (1999).
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Part I compares the defensive positions taken in two extremely similar
cases—Ashcroft v. Iqbal8 and Ziglar v. Abbasi9—that were litigated by the
DOJ across two different presidential administrations. This is to help
illustrate (admittedly by anecdote) that, even while affirmative enforcement
priorities can change significantly from one administration to the other,
defensive litigating positions can remain remarkably stable.
Parts II and III turn to showing what consequences this has in the context
of civil rights enforcement. Part II starts with the DOJ’s affirmative bureaus
themselves, with a focus on the CRD. The goal is to show that the defensive
bureaus impact the work of the CRD in at least two ways: (1) by channeling
enforcement priorities into areas that will not conflict with defensive
litigating positions and (2) by making affirmative enforcement priorities
more difficult to secure through the spread of transsubstantive doctrine that
suppresses rights enforcement, even in the areas in which there are no
conflicts with defensive positions. Part III moves beyond the direct impact
on CRD because defensive litigation positions taken by the DOJ can also
suppress affirmative rights enforcement by “private attorneys general,”
enforcement that nonetheless is consistent with the affirmative priorities of
Main Justice. Finally, Part IV offers some thoughts on what lessons we might
draw from these observations. For the most part, I devote my attention to
how institutional design might ameliorate the tensions I identify in this
Article.
I. THE PERSISTENCE OF DEFENSIVE AGENDAS ACROSS ADMINISTRATION
THROUGH THE LENS OF IQBAL AND ZIGLAR
Much ink has been spilled on the role that affirmative enforcers have
played in the DOJ and how a new executive branch can set new agendas.10
And some enforcement areas have significant access-to-justice implications,
such as affirmative enforcement of civil rights through the CRD or similar
state enforcement bodies. As one example, it is no surprise that over time
there are significant differences between CRD’s work in Republican and
Democratic administrations.11 Along the same lines, it is taken as a given

8. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
9. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
10. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement?: Accountability and
Independence for the Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929, 973–74 (2017) (summarizing
literature).
11. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Civil Rights Déjà Vu, Only Worse, AM. PROSPECT
(Dec. 12, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/civil-rights-d%C3%A9j%C3%A0-vu-only-worse
[https://perma.cc/VW3K-H7KW]; see also Jennifer Nou, Sub-Regulating Elections, 2013
SUP. CT. REV. 135, 170 (summarizing reports of political decision-making within the Bush and
Obama CRDs). Although unusual, there also can be conflict within the same administration,
as when the DOJ recently filed an amicus brief in a case involving discrimination on the basis
of sexuality in which it stated that the EEOC, which had filed a brief taking the opposite
position, was “not speaking for the United States.” Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 1, Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775), 2017 WL
3277292, at *1.
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that prosecutorial decisions and priorities will change from administration to
administration, sometimes profoundly.12
Thus, although the scholarship regarding prosecutorial priorities,
affirmative litigation, and high-level departmental priorities for agencies
such as the DOJ is rich and deep, scholars have for the most part failed to
consider the role of the defensive bureaus present in entities like the DOJ.
The literature has generally overlooked the work of lawyers who defend
against Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuits, Bivens suits, and the like. Other
than work regarding high-visibility decisions to defend (or not) particular
laws from constitutional challenge,13 the role of defensive bureaus and the
lawyers who staff them has been underexamined, even though the work of
the defensive bureaus vastly exceeds that of entities like CRD.
Although affirmative enforcement priorities may shift from one
administration to another, this Part exposes how defensive litigating positions
are far less likely to do the same. This is illustrated through two concrete
examples—the government’s litigating positions in Iqbal and Ziglar, two
important Supreme Court cases that nearly book-end President Obama’s time
in office. The first, Iqbal, argued in December 2008 and decided in May
2009, involved claims of abuse by pretrial detainees held in federal custody
in Brooklyn, New York, during the investigation of the September 11
attacks.14 Ziglar, argued in January 2017 and decided in June 2017, involved
nearly identical claims brought by immigration detainees.15 In the interest of
full disclosure, I was lead counsel in the Iqbal case, from its inception until
the case concluded; and I was one of the attorneys who represented the
plaintiffs in Ziglar when the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court. In both
cases, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims. In Iqbal, the Court
rested on pleading grounds, while in Ziglar the Court relied on Bivens
doctrine16 and qualified immunity. And both cases have significant accessto-justice implications beyond their context.

12. See generally Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: The President’s
Deference to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 387 (2017).
13. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Compelling State Interest: On “Due
Process of Lawmaking” and the Professional Responsibility of the Public Lawyer, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 1035, 1044–45 (1994); Daniel J. Meltzer, Lecture, Executive Defense of
Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1187 (2012) (questioning the “regime in which each
administration views itself as having significant latitude to refuse to enforce and defend acts
of Congress”); Katherine Shaw, Constitutional Nondefense in the States, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
213, 215–16 (2014); see also Carlos A. Ball, When May a President Refuse to Defend a
Statute?: The Obama Administration and DOMA, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 77, 77 n.1
(2011); Charles Fried, The Solicitor General’s Office, Tradition, and Conviction, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 549, 549 (2012) (criticizing the Obama administration’s decision to abandon its
defense of DOMA).
14. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
15. See generally Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
16. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). For a summary and critique of recent trends in the doctrine, see generally
Alexander A. Reinert & Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Reframing Bivens
after Minneci, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1473 (2013).

2018]

GOVERNMENT DEFENDERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS

2185

Both cases serve as useful points of comparison for the role that
administrative change may (or may not) play in agenda setting by the DOJ’s
defensive bureaus. Iqbal was litigated during the administration of President
George W. Bush. Every significant legal argument in the case was made by
lawyers within the Bush administration’s DOJ. Ziglar was litigated after the
decision in Iqbal, with every significant legal argument made by lawyers
within the Obama administration’s DOJ.17
Nonetheless, the legal arguments advanced in each case were barely
distinguishable. If anything, the lawyers within the Obama administration
made arguments that could be said to be more aggressive in terms of their
impact on access to justice in civil rights actions. In Iqbal, for example,
defendants Ashcroft and Mueller focused most of their attention in the lower
courts on qualified immunity, arguing that in the chaos surrounding the
September 11 attacks and the ensuing investigation, it was not “clearly
established” that constitutional law prohibiting discrimination and the like
applied to the treatment of the plaintiffs.18 The argument, reduced to its
basics, was that the context of September 11 and the ensuing investigation
were so unique that law that had been well established up until September
11, 2001, became murky on September 12.
The Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly19 shifted the
landscape of the argument in Iqbal. Announced after the Second Circuit
heard oral argument in Iqbal, Twombly suggested that the pleading standard
of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had changed, which created
space for defendants to argue that a complaint should be dismissed if it did
not state a “plausible” claim for relief.20 The United States had supported
this position as amicus curiae in Twombly,21 and the DOJ lawyers in Iqbal
shifted gears once Twombly was decided.22 After the Second Circuit rejected
the government’s arguments regarding qualified immunity, it distinguished
Twombly and held that the plaintiffs’ complaint was sufficient even under the
plausibility standard.23 Up until that point, the heart of the defendants’
argument had been focused on qualified immunity, not pleading. But with
the decision in Twombly and the Solicitor General’s decision to file a

17. In both cases, although some of the defendants were represented by private counsel,
the highest-level defendants, as well as the United States, were represented by the DOJ.
18. See, e.g., Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Claims
Against Attorney General John Ashcroft in His Individual Capacity at 3–5, Elmaghraby v.
Ashcroft, No. 04 Civ. 1809, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).
19. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
20. Id. at 555–56.
21. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 2482696.
22. The story is slightly more complex than this. Certiorari had been granted in Twombly
by the time oral argument was heard in Iqbal. During oral argument, the Second Circuit asked
the parties to submit letter briefs as to whether they expected the pending decision in Twombly
to have an impact on the Second Circuit’s resolution of Iqbal. Plaintiffs and the DOJ lawyers
representing Ashcroft and Mueller agreed that they did not expect Twombly to have an impact,
no matter how it was resolved.
23. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–59 (2d Cir. 2007).
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certiorari petition in Iqbal, the defendants abandoned their qualified
immunity arguments and turned entirely to pleading.
But even in making their pleading arguments, the Solicitor General’s office
under President Bush construed them narrowly. As with its qualified
immunity arguments in the lower courts, the government argued that in a case
like Iqbal—that is, one involving the confluence of national security, highlevel officials, and qualified immunity—the pleading standard should be
stricter than is typically expected.24 The government refrained from making
the novel qualified immunity argument it had raised below and never argued
that there was no Bivens remedy available for allegations like the plaintiffs’.
The Court’s decision in Iqbal gave the defendants more than they asked
for. Implicitly rejecting the defendants’ argument that pleading standards
should depend on whether the case involves high-level officials in a national
security context, the Court made clear that Twombly’s plausibility pleading
standard applied across the board, even if applying it required cognizance of
the substantive legal context of a particular case.25 Even though the
government had never quarreled with the plaintiff’s theory of supervisory
liability (based on well-worn Second Circuit case law),26 the Court sua sponte
decided that a heightened level of liability (intentionality rather than
recklessness) was appropriate when suing supervisors, at least in cases
involving equal protection claims.27 Finally, the Court invited district courts
to apply their “judicial experience and common sense” to resolve pleading
disputes, even when doing so might require substituting unsworn assertions
in a defendant’s brief for allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint.28
Each of these holdings has significant access-to-justice implications,
which I and others have documented in other writings.29 But the aspect of
this story that I want to emphasize is not necessarily that Iqbal itself had
access-to-justice implications, but that it went beyond the (arguably) narrow
confines of the arguments put forward by the Bush-era DOJ lawyers who
litigated the case on behalf of defendants Ashcroft and Mueller.
This sets the table for a consideration of the arguments raised in Ziglar, a
case that, by the time it reached the Supreme Court, had been litigated entirely
by the Obama administration’s DOJ. Ziglar came to the Court in a similar
posture as did Iqbal, with the Second Circuit having rejected most of the
defendants’ arguments for dismissing the case.30 And on certiorari, the

24. Brief for Petitioners at 11–13, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (No. 07-1015),
2008 WL 4063957, at *11–13.
25. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
26. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (outlining the myriad ways a
“supervisory defendant” may be liable).
27. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77.
28. Id. at 679.
29. See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading,
101 VA. L. REV. 2117 (2015) [hereinafter Reinert, Plausibility Pleading]; Alexander A.
Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011).
30. Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 301–02 (2d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Ziglar v.
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
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Solicitor General’s office was arguably more aggressive in defending against
the litigation than it had been in Iqbal.
The defense lawyers in Ziglar raised not only pleading, resting heavily on
the Court’s decision in Iqbal, but also made two other arguments with quite
stark access-to-justice consequences. First, the Solicitor General’s office
argued that there should not even be a Bivens damages remedy for the kinds
of allegations of abuse and mistreatment alleged by the plaintiffs in Ziglar.31
This argument was certainly available to the defendants when Iqbal was
litigated, yet at no point was it raised in briefs at any level of the proceeding.
Second, the Obama Solicitor General’s office argued that there should be
qualified immunity (an argument that was essentially abandoned by the time
the case reached the Court in Iqbal) for reasons that, if accepted, could
resonate beyond the Bivens context to § 1983 and the like.32
For the most part, the government’s arguments prevailed in the Court.
Most dramatically, the Court issued a decision on Bivens remedies that
already is resonating in every Bivens case being heard in the lower courts.33
As Justice Breyer argued in dissent, the majority’s opinion was comparable
to setting fire to one’s house to escape the cold.34
A natural inquiry, at this stage, is where this takes us and why. The
attorneys in both Iqbal and Twombly were making arguments to protect their
individual clients; these were, perhaps, the best arguments that could be made
given the law. Some have argued that government lawyers defending civil
cases are obliged to behave precisely in this way—to make the best
arguments on the facts and law in every case.35
But this, perhaps, is precisely the point. Absent intervention, we should
not expect the mission or agendas of defensive bureaus sited in government
agencies to change from one administration to the next. As opposed to
affirmative enforcers who can choose which cases to take and which legal
theories to push or not, defensive bureaus take what they are given and make
the arguments they can. They likely feel their strongest obligation is to their
clients, often individual officers accused of misconduct (or sometimes even
the federal government itself, potentially on the hook for misconduct through
its application of the Federal Tort Claims Act). The larger issue is not
whether the arguments made by the attorneys in Ziglar or Iqbal were
31. Brief for Petitioners at 14, Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (No. 15-1359), 2016 WL 6873020,
at *14.
32. Id. at 14–16; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
33. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1854–64. Since Ziglar, every Court of Appeals to consider
whether to extend Bivens to a new context has declined to do so. See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870
F.3d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 2017); Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 2017);
González v. Vélez, 864 F.3d 45, 55–56 (1st Cir. 2017).
34. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1884 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“If you are cold, put on a sweater,
perhaps an overcoat, perhaps also turn up the heat, but do not set fire to the house.”).
35. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. This is not to say that the matter is beyond
dispute. See, e.g., Matthew Windsor, (Pro)motion to Dismiss?: Constitutional Tort Litigation
and Threshold Failure in the War on Terror, 1 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 241, 256 (2012) (“In
short, by facilitating threshold failure, government lawyers become complicit with their clients
in the administration in cutting off processes of public proof and accountability.”); see also
Green, supra note 7, at 239–40.
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appropriate. The issue is what impact defensive litigators might have on
access to justice and how that will affect affirmative rights enforcers both
within and without the government.
II. IMPACT OF DEFENSIVE LITIGATION
DECISIONS WITHIN THE DOJ
This Part shows that affirmative rights enforcers within the DOJ can be
undermined by defensive litigation bureaus. This Part focuses on the CRD,
where the tension might be most salient. Part II.A suggests that the CRD has
historically shied away from taking positions that would jeopardize the
ability of defensive bureaus to defend federal employees and agencies.
Second, Part II.B. demonstrates how arguments made by defensive bureaus
directly undermine litigation positions taken by the CRD.
A. Relationship Between Defensive Bureaus
and Affirmative Enforcement Decisions
The DOJ’s CRD is rightly renowned for its aggressive enforcement,
especially during the Obama administration. It focuses its sights on police
departments, local jails, and the like. When it enters the fray, it typically is
able to secure consent decrees that are broader and longer lasting than those
obtained through litigation by NGOs and private civil rights lawyers.
But there is ample evidence that the affirmative enforcement decisions of
the CRD are made conscious of the posture of the defensive bureaus. For
example, at the same time that CRD was aggressively seeking to intervene in
local law enforcement practices and cases involving conditions of
confinement for people in jails and prisons, there was widespread litigation
and advocacy regarding the overuse and harms of solitary confinement
throughout federal and state prisons.36 The CRD never intervened or filed a

36. See Reuven Blau & Stephen Rex Brown, Number of Rikers Island Inmates Placed in
Solitary Confinement Shrinks to Just 1.7% of City Jail Population, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr.
21, 2016, 12:01 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/rikers-island-solitarypopulation-drops-167-inmates-article-1.2609868 [https://perma.cc/H6U2-NJQY] (reporting
on changes to rules in Rikers Island to reduce use of solitary confinement); Tim Hull, Arizona
Agrees to Fix Prison Health System, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Oct. 14, 2014),
https://www.courthousenews.com/arizona-agrees-tofix-prison-health-system/
[https://perma.cc/HHR5-9SYC] (reporting a settlement in Arizona); Randall Pinkston & Phil
Hirschkorn, Mississippi Rethinks Solitary Confinement, CBS NEWS (May 18, 2013, 9:13 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mississippi-rethinks-solitary-confinement/
[https://perma.cc/N9N7-85EJ] (reporting a settlement in Mississippi); Rick Raemisch, Why
We Ended Long-Term Solitary Confinement in Colorado, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/opinion/solitary-confinement-colorado-prison.html
[https://perma.cc/Q7E9-YJVK] (announcing end to long-term solitary confinement in
Colorado state prisons in an editorial by the executive director of Colorado Department of
Corrections); Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, New York State Agrees to Overhaul
Solitary
Confinement
in
Prisons,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
16,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/nyregion/new-york-state-agrees-to-overhaul-solitaryconfinement-in-prisons.html [https://perma.cc/7LHP-56PK] (reporting a New York State
settlement); Paige St. John, California Agrees to Move Thousands of Inmates out of Solitary
Confinement, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015, 8:09 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-

2018]

GOVERNMENT DEFENDERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS

2189

statement of interest in any case seeking to reform the use of extreme
isolation in jails and prisons. Even if CRD had been interested in doing so,37
any action in the area of solitary confinement would have created tension
with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), which operates one of the most
dehumanizing units for extreme isolation at a federal prison in Florence,
Colorado.38 Indeed, CRD has never intervened or sought to investigate
conditions of confinement or the use of solitary confinement as part of its
civil rights enforcement authority. Nor has it ever investigated conditions of
confinement for immigration detainees, which would inevitably ensnare
them in a conflict with ICE.
The evidence suggests that CRD limits its involvement to challenging law
enforcement practices that are inconsistent with the best practices of federal
law enforcement personnel. As one example, from 2010 to 2011, the BOP
announced a change to its policy by which it provided medical treatment to
transgender prisoners diagnosed with gender dysphoria held in BOP
custody.39 It announced that it would no longer follow a so-called “freezeframe” policy, in which hormone treatment for any person with gender
dysphoria is kept frozen at the level provided at the time he or she entered
the federal prison system.40 This freed up the CRD to file a Statement of
Interest in February 2015, which argued that a “freeze-frame” policy used by
the Georgia Department of Corrections was unconstitutional.41 In the
statement, the CRD made specific reference to the BOP’s policy regarding
the treatment of transgender prisoners, acknowledging that the BOP had
changed its policy in response to litigation.42 To my knowledge, this was the
first time that the CRD had asserted its enforcement power in a case involving
the treatment of transgender prisoners.
B. How Defensive Litigation Positions Undermine
CRD’s Existing Affirmative Enforcement Priorities
While affirmative arms of the DOJ appear to have steered clear of taking
legal positions that would jeopardize the defensive bureaus, the same cannot
be said for the defensive bureaus’ regard for the constraints on affirmative
me-ln-california-will-move-thousands-of-inmates-out-of-solitary-20150901-story.html
[https://perma.cc/M2H8-E525] (reporting a settlement in California).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1980).
38. The Florence ADX is where some of the BOP’s most infamous prisoners are housed
and has been the subject of lawsuits and media coverage regarding the extreme conditions
found there. See Mark Binelli, Inside America’s Toughest Federal Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/29/magazine/inside-americas-toughest-federalprison.html [https://perma.cc/9G6G-NSHJ].
39. See Memorandum from Newton E. Kendig & Charles E. Samuels Jr. to Chief Exec.
Officers (May 31, 2011), http://www.governmentattic.org/8docs/BOP-GID-Memos_20102011.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP85-ABJL]; Memorandum from Newton E. Kendig & D. Scott
Dodrill to Chief Exec. Officers (June 15, 2010), http://www.governmentattic.org/8docs/BOPGID-Memos_2010-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP85-ABJL].
40. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
41. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Diamond v. Owens, 131 F. Supp.
3d 1346 (M.D. Ga. 2015) (No. 15 Civ. 50).
42. See id. at 17.

2190

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

enforcement arms of the DOJ. Take pleading doctrine, for example. Since
Iqbal, defensive bureaus have aggressively pushed to expand the barriers
posed by the plausibility pleading doctrine, even though to do so could
theoretically have a deleterious impact on the ability of affirmative enforcers
to do their jobs.
Perhaps the most salient example can be found in issues relating to
supervisory liability.43 When federal officials are sued on a Bivens theory, it
is now commonplace for DOJ lawyers defending the case to seek to extend
Iqbal’s supervisory-liability holding by arguing that recovery against
supervisory officials is only permissible when the officials themselves
participate directly in the same constitutional misconduct that lower-level
officials have engaged in.44 In these cases, the defendants argue that a
supervisor’s knowledge of, and acquiescence in, a subordinate’s wrongful
conduct is never sufficient to hold a supervisor liable in a Bivens action.45
Although courts do not always take up the invitation to resolve the issue,46
the position taken by the defensive bureau, in service of its individual clients,
is in substantial tension with the affirmative enforcement position of the
CRD.47
The CRD, contrary to the government lawyers defending supervisory
liability claims in Bivens cases, has historically taken a position that seeks to
limit the reach of Iqbal’s supervisory-liability holding. This can be seen in
the CRD’s own affirmative litigation enforcing constitutional rights, its
amicus briefs in support of civil rights plaintiffs, and its prelitigation
investigations of allegations of constitutional violations by state and
municipal agencies. In almost all actions instituted by the CRD pursuant to
its civil rights enforcement authority, the United States has explicitly relied
on, among other things, allegations of supervisory involvement identical to
those it derides as legally insufficient when defending Bivens claims.48
43. The Court in Iqbal termed “supervisory liability” a “misnomer” while simultaneously
stating that individuals can be liable for violating their “superintendent responsibilities.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009).
44. Brief for Appellants at 18, Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 643 F. 3d
60 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 10-1479), 2010 WL 4469175, at *18 (insisting that plaintiffs allege that
the defendants themselves “searched or seized . . . the plaintiffs or participated in or planned”
the allegedly unconstitutional home raids).
45. Id. at 17, 24.
46. Argueta, 643 F.3d at 70 (declining to decide the supervisory-liability standard).
47. In the interest of full disclosure, I authored an amicus brief in Argueta that identified
the tension. See generally Brief for Public Justice et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting PlaintiffsAppellees, Argueta, 643 F. 3d 60 (No. 08-cv-1652), 2010 WL 5558358.
48. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment at 17, United States v. Arizona, No. 97-476 (D. Ariz. May 15, 2007),
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-AZ-0002-0004.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K69U-HDBE] (relying on a theory of supervisory liability where the
defendants failed to provide adequate training and investigation of sexual misconduct by
staff); Complaint para. 16, United States v. Nassau County, No. 2:01-2382 (E.D.N.Y.
dismissed Jan. 1, 2002), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-NY-0010-0001.pdf
[http://perma.cc/WK27-DJ8Y] (alleging that defendants violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments by “tolerat[ing] and condon[ing] the use of excessive force against” detainees,
failing to train and supervise, failing to maintain adequate policies, failing to adequately
investigate complaints, and failing to discipline errant staff); Complaint para. 14, United States
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The United States’ affirmative litigating position did not change with the
announcement of Iqbal. When required to by district courts, the United
States includes supervisory-liability allegations that are based on the same
theory that the DOJ argues is insufficient in defending Bivens claims.49
Even when the United States has not been a formal litigant, the CRD has
consistently taken a position at odds with that of the DOJ in Bivens cases. In
the Ninth Circuit, the CRD filed an amicus brief arguing that a district court
improperly granted judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages, in part
arguing that punitive damages, like supervisory liability, was necessary to
ensure adequate enforcement of civil rights laws.50 Indeed, the CRD drew a
useful comparison between punitive damages and supervisory liability, and
it urged a standard for supervisory liability that is far broader than the position
taken by the DOJ in its defensive posture.51
In so doing, the United States favorably cited the pre-Iqbal supervisory
liability standard from the First Circuit, in which that court applied a
deliberate indifference standard for supervisory liability in police
misconduct. The Ninth Circuit ultimately agreed with the United States’
position. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant’s “reckless
indifference” was sufficient to entitle a plaintiff to punitive damages, and
that a plaintiff could show such indifference by demonstrating that the
defendant knew of unlawful conduct by subordinates and failed to take any
action.52

Plaintiff-friendly theories of supervisory liability are important to the
CRD’s affirmative enforcement priorities. On many occasions, the CRD has
clearly articulated the importance of supervisory oversight of governmental

v. Columbus Consol. City/Cty. Gov’t, No. 99-cv-00132-HL (M.D. Ga. dismissed Sept. 30,
1999), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-GA-0003-0002.pdf [https://perma.
cc/2E7K-MCTL] (seeking relief for violations of the Constitution caused by the supervisorydefendants’ failure to provide “adequate staffing and staff training, and fail[ure] to develop
and implement appropriate policies and procedures to safely operate the Jail”); see also Third
Amended Complaint para. 28, Johnson v. Insley, No. 87-369-Civ-T-10A (M.D. Fla. Dec. 14,
1988), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/MH-FL-0001-0009.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9DCX-RFH9] (alleging that supervisors violated substantive due process by failing to
protect hospital patients from harm by failing to supervise staff, and failing to investigate
abuse).
49. See Amended Complaint para. 21, United States v. Erie County, No. 09-CV-0849
(W.D.N.Y. July 23, 2010), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-NY-00590006.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8GM-SK8Q] (alleging that defendants knew of serious risks of
harm to detainees); id. para. 22 (alleging that defendants “have repeatedly failed to take
reasonable measures to prevent staff from inflicting serious harm on inmates”); id. paras. 23,
27, 31, 35 (alleging that subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct was caused by supervisors’
“failure to adopt policies necessary to prevent [such] violations”); id. paras. 24, 28, 32, 36
(failure-to-train allegations); id. paras. 25, 29, 33, 37 (allegations of failure to discipline or
supervise).
50. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting PlaintiffsAppellants/Cross-Appellees, Reed v. Penasquitos Casablanca Owner’s Ass’n, 381 Fed. App’x
674 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-55151), 2009 WL 2824432.
51. See Brief for Public Justice et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees,
supra note 47, at 27–28 (citing law indicating that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “‘supervisory
inaction’ can be reckless where defendant failed to act on knowledge of illegality”).
52. Id. at 27.
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agency operations and staff to preventing constitutional violations by line
officers. When such violations occur in a recurrent or systematic way,
improved supervision is almost always an essential component of an effective
remedy. This connection is drawn quite explicitly by the CRD in its
prelitigation letters to state and local governmental agencies, which present
the CRD’s findings regarding the prevalence of constitutional violations and
its recommendations for preventing their recurrence.
Thus, when
investigating the Mercer County Geriatric Center in New Jersey, the CRD
found widespread constitutional violations and recommended, among other
remedial measures, meaningful training, investigation, and follow-up of
incidents of abuse.53 As the CRD observed when investigating the Virgin
Islands Police Department, “[p]olicies and procedures are the primary means
by which police departments communicate their standards and expectations
to their officers,”54 and thus supervisory oversight and training is essential to
remedying constitutional misconduct.55
53. See Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney Gen., to Robert D. Prunetti,
Mercer Cty. Exec. (Oct. 9, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/crt/findings-letter-mercer-countygeriatric-center [http://perma.cc/5VTJ-W2KM]. The CRD similarly drew a link between
inadequate supervision and unconstitutional conduct when investigating a Woodbridge, New
Jersey, facility. See Letter from Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Hon. James E.
McGreevey, Governor of N.J. 3, 34–36 (Nov. 12, 2004), https://www.clearinghouse.net
/chDocs/public/ID-NJ-0004-0001.pdf [http://perma.cc/6MVQ-4DUA] (detailing minimal
supervision and training remedies to prevent unconstitutional harm at the Woodbridge
Developmental Center); see also Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney Gen., to
Hon. James E. McGreevey, Governor of N.J. 5 (Apr. 8, 2003),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/04/14/newlisbon_finding_letter.pd
f [http://perma.cc/7SKG-4TK2] (identifying lack of staff training and incident reporting as one
cause of unconstitutional failure to protect from harm at the New Lisbon Developmental
Center); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Hon. Jack Markell,
Governor of Del. 14 (Nov. 9, 2010), https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/
delaware_findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/FEZ8-3P3V] (criticizing the lack of investigation of
incidents of abuse and the lack of interventions to “minimize or eliminate risks of harm” at the
Delaware Psychiatric Center).
54. Letter from Shanetta Y. Cutlar, Chief of the Special Litig. Unit of the Dep’t of Justice,
to Kerry Drue, Attorney Gen. et al. 2 (Oct. 5, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/crt/legacy/2010/12/15/virgin_island_pd_talet_10-5-05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R27RDN8R].
55. Id. at 22–27; see also Letter from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to
Hon. Chris Collins, Erie Cty. Exec. 41 (July 15, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/15/Erie_findlet_redact_07-15-09.pdf [http://perma.cc/39SEE9NU] (recommending oversight and training on use of force at Erie County Holding Center
and Erie County Correctional Facility); Letter from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Attorney
Gen. of the Civil Rights Div., to Marlin N. Gusman, Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff 5–6, 9–
10, 24–25 (Sept. 11, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/15/
parish_findlet.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLA8-EPE9] (providing recommendations on oversight
remedies to prevent excessive use of force at Orleans Parish Prison); Letter from Loretta King,
Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. et al., to Raymond P. Fizpatrick, Jr. 5, 17, 18, 30 (June 9,
2009),
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-NY-0041-0001.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q4UE-EPPB]; Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen. and
Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Hon. Andrew J. Spano, Westchester
Cty. Exec. 7, 32–35 (Nov. 19, 2009) https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/crt/legacy/2010/12/15/Westchester_findlet_11-19-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/S346-BM62]
(detailing recommendations regarding changes in supervision necessary to prevent
unconstitutional uses of force and describing supervisory oversight as critical to ensure that

2018]

GOVERNMENT DEFENDERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS

2193

It would not be hard to find similar examples of tension between the
positions taken by the DOJ in a defensive posture and the positions taken by
the United States in an affirmative litigation position. For example,
arguments regarding pleading doctrine made from a defensive posture will
be in direct tension with the kinds of arguments that a plaintiff might make.
And while the federal government might worry less than the typical plaintiff
about meeting higher pleading standards,56 this does not dissolve the
potential for tension.
The bottom line is not to police the kinds of arguments made by the
government in a defensive posture—at least not yet—but merely to observe
that even though affirmative litigation units have ample resources to achieve
enforcement priorities, they can be undermined by their colleagues who wear
different hats and are pursuing different agendas.
III. IMPACT OF DEFENSIVE AGENDA SETTING ON
PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
Affirmative enforcement of civil rights is not done primarily by the federal
government. Most cases are brought by “private attorneys general.” Indeed,
the government expects and hopes that most affirmative rights enforcement
will be accomplished this way because affirmative enforcement bureaus
cannot intervene in every case in which there is a potential civil rights
violation. But despite the symbiotic relationship between private enforcers
and governmental enforcers, the arguments made by defensive bureaus
naturally interfere with private civil rights enforcement.
The impact of the defensive bureaus stretches beyond similar cases in
which federal officials or entities bear the risk of loss. Take qualified
immunity, for example, where some of the most significant decisions have
arisen in the context of federal officials. The lineage starts with Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,57 which made qualified immunity an objective test and thereby
made it easier to dismiss claims on qualified immunity grounds.58 It moves
on to Behrens v. Pelletier,59 which gives defendants multiple bites at the
qualified immunity apple through interlocutory appeals.60 More recently,
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd61 made it clear that “all but the plainly incompetent” were
protected by qualified immunity.62 And, most recently, there is Ziglar,
discussed above.63
In all of these cases, Bivens defendants successfully raised qualified
immunity, but their success bleeds into similar cases brought against state
subordinates’ conduct is consistent with constitutional standards at the Westchester County
Jail).
56. Reinert, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 29, at 2154–56 (presenting data suggesting
that federal government was not adversely impacted by plausibility pleading standards).
57. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
58. Id. at 819.
59. 516 U.S. 299 (1996).
60. Id. at 311.
61. 563 U.S. 731 (2011).
62. Id. at 743 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
63. See supra Part I.
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and local officials. This is because the qualified immunity recognized in
§ 1983 has been construed to be identical to the scope of immunity applicable
in Bivens claims. This can have an impact not only on the work of private
attorneys general but also, by extension, on affirmative enforcement
priorities of the federal government because private attorneys are expected to
fill the substantial gaps in the work of the CRD in enforcing civil rights
against state and local actors.
It is not hard to come up with other areas where positions taken by
defensive bureaus within the state or federal government have access to
justice implications for affirmative rights enforcers both within and without
the government. For example, just as the defensive arguments made
regarding supervisory liability in Bivens cases can impact the CRD’s work
directly, they likely have a greater impact on civil rights litigators bringing
claims against state and local officials—claims that are in keeping with the
CRD’s mission but that the CRD cannot litigate themselves because of their
limited bandwidth.
Ensuring that supervisors are liable for their constitutional violations has
historically been important to meeting both goals of civil rights damages
litigation. Where a plaintiff has suffered a distinct constitutional injury
caused by the conduct of both direct participants and supervisory officials,
compensation from all parties is just and sometimes necessary to ensure a
complete remedy. For instance, when a direct officer has insufficient funds
to fully compensate an injured plaintiff, a supervisor who is also culpable
may be able to fill the gap. Moreover, there may be circumstances when line
officers are not available to pay damages because, for example, they cannot
be identified or because of a lack of indemnification, but supervisors are
available to pay such damages.
Supervisors may also be more subject to the deterrent effect of individual
liability and more important to deter, given their greater authority, greater
institutional affiliation with their employing agencies, better access to
information necessary to prevent constitutional violations, and responsibility
to ensure that line-officer staff are properly trained and supervised.64 Indeed,
analogous to well-accepted principles of common law tort theory, supervisors
are the “cheapest cost avoiders” in the constitutional tort context.65
The importance of maintaining supervisory liability is reflected in the case
law. Take as one example the well-documented problem of sexual abuse and
rape in prisons.66 Prisoners who have been victimized by such abuse often
64. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505–06 (1978) (emphasizing the
importance of liability for high-ranking officials).
65. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972); Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability and the Cheapest
Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1992); cf. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1332 (1989) (“The most efficient method
of discouraging sexual harassment may be by creating incentives for the employer to police
the conduct of its supervisory employees, and this is done by making the employer liable.”).
66. See generally ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL
VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2008–09 (2010),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri0809.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJR7-T68Y].
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have limited remedies against the direct participants; if the direct participants
are other detainees, they will likely be judgment proof, and if they are
correction officers, they will almost certainly not be indemnified by their
employing agencies.67 Yet under the arguments made by the DOJ in
numerous Bivens cases, even supervisors who know of and acquiesce in the
rape of prisoners will not be held liable because they did not participate
directly in the rape or its planning.68
Even outside of the context of prison sexual-abuse cases, supervisoryliability claims have forced the exposure and examination—and, one can
reasonably expect, the correction in many cases—of practices or omissions
by higher-level officials that exposed prisoners to an excessive risk of harm.
Thus, just as the defensive arguments made in the Bivens context can have
significant implications for the work of the CRD, they also have the potential
to interfere more broadly with civil rights enforcement outside of litigation
that involves the federal government.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF RECOGNIZING THE AGENDA-SETTING
ROLE OF THE DEFENSIVE GOVERNMENT LITIGATOR
Although affirmative enforcement priorities are expected to shift from one
administration to the next, we also can expect that defensive priorities will
remain static. If we could isolate one from the other, this would not raise the
concerns I have identified here. But that is by its nature impossible in a legal
regime in which doctrine, whether technically transsubstantive or not, cannot
easily be cabined to one particular area, and where the government occupies
litigating postures in the same area of law, such as civil rights or employment
discrimination. As a result, defensive litigation positions can interfere with,
and even overwhelm, affirmative enforcement priorities.
This concluding Part suggests some ramifications for the tension between
defensive litigation and affirmative enforcement priorities. First, it is worth
considering whether an answer is to be found in considering the professional
obligations of government lawyers, and lawyers in defensive bureaus in
particular. Most scholarship that has examined the ethics of government
lawyers has focused on prosecutors, and even the minority of scholars who
have considered the civil government litigator have not generally focused on

67. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:10-1 (West 2017) (stating that the state need not
indemnify an employee who committed an “intentional wrong”); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 17
(McKinney 2017) (same).
68. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rappahannock Reg’l Jail Auth., 703 F. Supp. 2d 549, 559–60
(E.D. Va. 2010) (finding that a supervisor was not liable even when multiple instances of
sexual assaults and “obsession” with a specific inmate by a line officer were known, but no
steps were taken to intervene); Hammond v. Gordon County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1288–90
(N.D. Ga. 2002) (holding that supervisors are not liable when supervisors provide no formal
training to most subordinates concerning sexual harassment or proper contact with inmates,
allowing subordinates “essentially [to do] as they please[],” notwithstanding a history of
complaints about staff sexual misconduct); Peddle v. Sawyer, 64 F. Supp. 2d 12, 18–19 (D.
Conn. 1999) (finding that there is no liability even when supervisors know of an officer’s
history of sexual abuse but nonetheless assign him to posts with “prolonged and unsupervised
contact with female inmates, including the overnight shift in the sexual trauma unit”).
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the tension identified here.69 Instead, scholars have focused more on
conflicts that might arise between agencies and their employees, or the
validity of pursuing nonfrivolous—but losing—defenses.70
If ethical obligations have something to say regarding this conundrum, I
suspect it might be found in our understanding of the client in defensive
litigation. If, for example, the client is—as some have argued—the “public”
or the “common good,” or even the agency rather than the individual
defendant,71 one could thread a needle, perhaps, to ensure that defensive
litigators keep affirmative enforcement obligations in mind when deciding
which arguments to raise (or reserve) in particular cases. But even if this
were part of the answer, one cannot escape the fact that it requires a form of
institutional design that permits the communication of priorities between
affirmative and defensive bureaus, as well as a means to resolve conflicts
when they arise.
Rachel Barkow and Mark William Osler came to similar conclusions when
considering the Obama administration’s overall failure to meet the high
expectations of criminal justice reform that accompanied his election.72 As
Barkow and Osler describe it, because President Obama gave too much
deference to the career prosecutors who occupy most (high- and low-level)
positions in the DOJ, progressive goals to reduce incarceration and
punitiveness in the federal system were stymied at every turn.73 They
proposed—in the form of advice to future administrations—designing
institutions both within and without the DOJ to create more space for a
fulsome discussion and consideration of reforms that career prosecutors
would instinctively resist.74
Returning to the topic of this Article, one could imagine, for instance,
creating a “Civil Rights Protection Agency” which would exist outside of the
DOJ and do all of the current work of the CRD, focused on rights violations
caused by state and local governments, but also include within its purview
advice and consultation with federal agencies. There would be costs to this—
the CRD, situated as it is within the DOJ, might have a certain legitimacy and
internal role that it would sacrifice were it placed outside of the DOJ.
Alternatively, the DOJ could more consciously consider when it was
necessary for affirmative enforcement priorities to displace defensive
agendas. This is not unheard of. In 2014, Attorney General Eric Holder

69. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
70. Figley, supra note 7, at 371; Jacobs, supra note 7, at 1 (arguing for constraints on a
government lawyer who is defending suits that seek remedies that benefit a broad class of
persons rather than the individual plaintiff). Neither Jacobs nor Figley focuses on potential
tensions arising between defensive posture and affirmative litigation.
71. See, e.g., Figley, supra note 7, at 372–74 (proposing guidelines for government
attorneys defending FTCA claims based on the duty of a government lawyer to serve the
“public interest”); Green, supra note 7, at 269–70 (arguing that even if an individual
government official is a client, lawyer’s duties to the public are derivative of the official’s
“fiduciary” duty to the public).
72. Barkow & Osler, supra note 12.
73. See generally id.
74. Id. at 457–58.
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issued a memorandum stating that in any litigation that came before it, the
DOJ would take the position that the protections afforded by Title VII would
be extended to include a person’s gender identity, including transgender
status.75 The federal government, as the nation’s largest employer, would
presumably be hard pressed to articulate a different position in a Title VII
suit brought against a federal agency.
Perhaps the DOJ’s Office of Access to Justice could be given a larger
footprint to develop access-to-justice principles that would guide
argumentation made in defensive and affirmative cases. To date, the agency
has worked with the CRD to file amicus briefs or statements of interest in
cases focused on criminal justice issues, mostly indigent defense and cashbail systems in state and local governments.76 The Office was instrumental
in preparing a report to the White House on civil legal aid.77 The Office
could take on a broader portfolio that evaluates the impact of DOJ actions on
access to justice metrics.
Finally, however the DOJ might incorporate the insight that there can be
tension between defensive and affirmative positions, there will be moments
where a choice of priorities cannot be avoided. For example, imagine that
the DOJ (or the Solicitor General’s office) is considering whether to file an
appeal (or a petition for certiorari) in two different cases. One is a case in a
defensive posture, where the government unsuccessfully argued for dismissal
of a civil rights case, and one is a case in an affirmative posture, in which the
government’s civil rights case was dismissed on the defendant’s motion. A
successful argument on appeal in the defensive case will result in a slight
extension of prodefendant doctrine. A successful argument on appeal in the
affirmative case will result in a slight extension of proplaintiff doctrine. An
administration that cares about access to justice should at least think through
how to make that decision and recognize that there are consequences to
choosing whether and when to make those arguments on appeal.
Again, this kind of thinking is not foreign to the government. The Solicitor
General routinely files amicus briefs in the Supreme Court in which it
articulates the United States’ interest as resting both in its role as enforcer of
rights and common defendant in litigation.78 And the DOJ has taken
positions in other contexts, such as in proposed amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, in which it acknowledges its dual interests as both
75. See generally Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys (Dec.
15, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/file/188671/download [http://perma.cc/JW2T-GLEH].
76. Court Filings in Support of Access to Justice, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/atj/court-filings-support-access-justice
[https://perma.cc/4CMWK76Q].
77. See White House Legal Aid Interagency Roundtable Issues First Annual Report to the
President, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/white-houselegal-aid-interagency-roundtable-issues-first-annual-report-president
[https://perma.cc/5V9N-JHQJ].
78. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 893 (1984); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 1, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) (No. 89-7376), 1990 WL 10022404,
at *1; Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amicus Curiae at 1, Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979), 1985
WL 670162, at *1.
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an enforcer and a defender in civil cases. Thought could similarly be given
to how this dual role can be internalized in litigation to limit the tension that
I have identified in this Article.
CONCLUSION
It is a given that affirmative enforcement priorities shift with changes in
leadership. Less well understood is how the static nature of defensive
litigation postures can undermine affirmative enforcement goals. This brief
Article is meant to identify the problem, begin to understand its scope, and
suggest ways to limit the tension inherent in the dueling litigation roles often
occupied by governmental agencies.

